Administrative sanction of 19 May 2025

Fine AML Reporting
Entity
Alipay (Europe) Limited S.A.
Published
2 Sept 2025
Incident Period
2023-06-26/2024-01-31
Decision date
19 May 2025
Final
–
Penalty
€214,000
Legal Section
Article 2-1 (1)
Sanctioning statute
Law of 12 November 2004 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing
Substantive law
Law of 12 November 2004 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing
Source regulator
CSSF

Structured fields are extracted automatically. A dash means the value could not be reliably extracted; the original notice below is always complete. Sanctioning statute is the law the measure is based on; Substantive law is the law whose obligations were breached — often the same, but they differ when the sanction rests on a general provision rather than the specific rule that was broken.

Original notice text (Original)

ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION Administrative sanction of 19 May 2025 for non-compliance with professional obligations related to “anti-money laundering / counter financing of terrorism” Luxembourg, 02 September 2025 Administrative decision On 19 May 2025, following an on-site inspection, the CSSF imposed an administrative fine amounting to EUR 214,000 (two hundred and fourteen thousand) on “Alipay (Europe) Limited S.A.” (the “Electronic Money Institution”), authorised as electronic money institution in accordance with the provisions of the Law of 10 November 2009 on payment services. Legal framework/motivation This administrative fine was imposed by the CSSF pursuant to Article 2-1 (1) of the amended Law of 12 November 2004 on the fight against money-laundering and terrorist financing (“AML/CFT Law”) read in conjunction with the provisions of Article 8-4 (1), (2) and (3) of the AML/CFT Law for non- compliance with anti-money laundering / counter financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”) professional obligations. In order to determine the type and amount of the administrative sanction, the CSSF duly took into account all the legal and factual elements, including those presented by the Electronic Money Institution during the contradictory phase of the non-contentious administrative procedure as well the gravity and duration of the breaches and the financial situation of the legal person held responsible for the breaches at the time of the on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of Article 8-5 (1) of the AML/CFT Law, as well as the fact that the Electronic Money Institution has taken on board the findings and observations, fully cooperated with the CSSF and informed the CSSF of the corrective measures taken after the on-site inspection in order to remedy the identified breaches. The professional obligations in relation to which the breaches were observed are namely quoted in the relevant provisions of: (i) the AML/CFT Law, (ii) the amended Grand-ducal Regulation of 1 February 2010 (“AML/CFT Grand-ducal Regulation”) providing details on certain provisions of the AML/CFT Law, and (iii) the amended CSSF Regulation No 12-02 of 14 December 2012 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (“CSSF Regulation No 12-02”) which constitutes an implementing measure of the AML/CFT Law in their version applicable at the time of the on-site inspection.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION Legal bases for the publication This publication is made pursuant to the provisions of Article 8-6 (1) of the AML/CFT Law on a nominative basis, the CSSF having considered that none of the legal exceptions provided for in Article 8-6 (1) of the AML/CFT Law is applicable. Context and major cases of non-compliance with the professional obligations identified This administrative fine is the result of an on-site inspection carried out by the CSSF at the Electronic Money Institution between 26 June 2023 and 31 January 2024 covering the AML/CFT framework. During the on-site inspection, the CSSF identified important breaches to the AML/CFT professional obligations applicable to the Electronic Money Institution which related in particular to the following points: • Although the Electronic Money Institution had identified via its transaction monitoring tool indicators that generated suspicions of money laundering in 6 cases related to counterfeit goods, it did not file a declaration to the Financial Intelligence Unit (hereafter the “FIU”). Three of these cases related to accounts which have been closed by the Electronic Money Institution despite the presence of indicators that generated suspicions of money laundering. Those cases constitute a breach of the obligation foreseen in point (a) of Article 5 (1) of the AML/CFT Law to inform promptly and on its own initiative the FIU when there are reasonable grounds of suspicion of money laundering. • The transaction monitoring process did not operate efficiently as the CSSF had identified that the Electronic Money Institution had defined in its procedure timeframes to treat alerts generated leading in practice to some alerts being closed with substantial delays. Such defined timeframes did therefore not allow the Electronic Money Institution to take rapid action in the event of suspicion as foreseen by point (a) of Article 5 (1) of the AML/CFT Law and Article 39 (5) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02. • The CSSF identified that a certain number of financial sanction related alerts were closed with delay, which implies that for those alerts, the Electronic Money Institution would not have been in a position to apply restrictive measures in financial matters without delay if need be, thus constituting a failure to comply with point (d) of Article 3 (2) of the AML/CFT Law and Articles 33 (1) and 39 (1) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02. • In the context of applied customer due diligence measures, the CSSF observed that identification documents were missing for some clients and beneficial owners, whose identity was therefore not verified thus preventing the Electronic Money Institution from ensuring that the respective individuals had been correctly identified. This constitutes a failure to comply with points (a) and (b) of Article 3 (2) of the AML/CFT Law and Articles 20 (1) and 22 (1) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02. As the Electronic Money Institution did not meet physically its clients, and certain safeguards were absent, the CSSF furthermore observed that no specific measures to compensate the potentially higher risk that a non-face-to-face business relationship involves, in accordance

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ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION with Annex IV, point (2) (c) of the AML/CFT Law, had been implemented, although the Electronic Money Institution recognised itself that it was confronted with a lot of fake KYC documentation resulting in clients not duly identified and their identity not verified. This constitutes a failure to comply with point (a) of Article 3 (2) of the AML/CFT Law as well as Article 27 of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02. As part of a review of a sample of client files, the CSSF identified three cases for which the Electronic Money Institution did not conduct sufficient investigations concerning red flags related to the discrepancy between the type of merchants and the products sold or irregular price differences between branded goods sold on the market and those being sold by the client merchants. In all instances, the Electronic Money Institution had incoherent documents and information on file but did not proceed to further investigate these cases. As such, the Electronic Money Institution failed to comply with point (d) of Article 3 (2) of the AML/CFT Law and Article 32 (1) and (2) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02, which emphasise the obligation to pay attention to unusual transactions and to information differences compared to the declarations made by the customer. Finally, the blocking process of the Electronic Money Institution was inadequate as the CSSF identified that important transactions occurred on some accounts which were blocked for suspicion of money laundering, an associated predicate offence or terrorist financing, or incomplete KYC documentation and that an appropriate follow-up of blocked and unblocked accounts was not performed. This inadequate blocking process prevented the Electronic Money Institution from refraining to carry out transactions for clients having incomplete KYC documentation or presenting a suspicion of money laundering, an associated predicate offence or terrorist financing thus constituting a failure to comply with Articles 3 (4) indent 4 and 5 (3) of the AML/CFT Law. • The outsourcing framework was deficient as the outsourcing agreement between the Electronic Money Institution and the third-party delegate lacked a detailed description of the outsourced tasks to be implemented which prevented the Electronic Money Institution from complying with Article 37 (1) and (2) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02 which foresee regular control of compliance with the commitments arising from the outsourcing contract, in particular to gain comfort on the compliance of the outsourced tasks and the adequacy of the resources used. The CSSF further identified that the Compliance Monitoring Plan was too generic as it did not define any controls or Key Performance Indicators to ensure an oversight of the delegated tasks and that, in practice, the second line of defence did not perform regular controls on the obligations of the third-party delegate, thus constituting a failure to comply with Article 37 (2) and (5) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02 which foresee that in accordance with the risk based approach, the regular control shall ensure that the professional is provided with means to test and to monitor regularly and occasionally compliance with the obligations incumbent upon the third-party delegate. This also constitutes a breach of Articles 39 (6) and 42 (1a) and (5) of the CSSF Regulation No 12-02 which foresee that the Compliance function verifies the controls carried out by the first line of defense to ensure compliance with the AML/CFT policy.

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